Next spring, I’ll be co-coordinating “Improving Ourselves as Moral Agents”: Ethics and Neuroscience of Self-Control cluster group, hosted by the Philosophy unit at the University of Turku and made possible by a prize from the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control research project. The cluster group is comprised of a reading group and a series of three interdisciplinary workshops.
Check out turkuselfcontrol.wordpress.com for more details on how to participate and the CFP for our first workshop!
This post is first in a series of posts about the concept of moral enhancement.
Last week was Enhancing Understanding of Enhancement, a conference jointly organized by CSB and Hastings Center. The two-day conference was packed with interesting papers. My paper, “How Are Enhancements Moral?”, set two criteria for a meaningful definition of moral enhancement, then arguing that moral reasoning enhancements as well as moral conformity enhancements have difficulty meeting both. Below, I’m expanding on the first part of my paper: how moral enhancement, “in the true sense of the word”, should be defined.
Problems in Defining Moral Enhancement
Moral enhancement is an ambiguous term that, broadly defined, refers to using enhancement technologies in order to improve the subsequent conduct or moral psychology of the enhanced. Moral enhancement is in need of conceptual clarification for a number of reasons: Continue reading Enhancing Understanding of… Moral Enhancement