It’s been quiet in the blog – something’s been brewing… A master’s thesis, that is! Getting the thesis fresh out of the press feels great, but by no means do I feel done. There are so many new projects waiting, and I look forward to processing them here, as well.
But, just to commemorate this point in time, here’s the abstract for the thesis. The full text of the thesis can be downloaded from my academia.edu profile.
POLARIS KOI: Self-Enhancement, Well-Being, and Moral Worth
Master’s Thesis, 64 p.
Department of Philosophy, University of Turku
This thesis is an approach to the topic of whether the trait improvements accomplished by human enhancement technologies are morally valuable as such. While the moral desirability of self-improvement appears intuitive to many, some object that technological self-enhancement does not hold equal moral worth to conventional self-improvement.
Many defenders of enhancement technologies associate their moral desirability with the well-being they are purported to improve. I will present one way of articulating how the moral worth of self-enhancement can be defended on the basis of the well-being it confers, which I term ‘the well-being thesis’. This argument defines enhancement interventions as promoting well-being and proposes that actions that increase well-being are right actions. Acts of undergoing self-enhancement are, therefore, right acts, and they also meet the other criteria for acts with moral worth.
I examine the premises of the well-being thesis and subject it to central criticism against the moral desirability of the use of enhancement technologies. This discussion draws heavily from recent debate concerning ‘moral enhancements’, a class of interventions intended to alter our moral psychology. The central arguments of this debate are expanded and applied across self-enhancements as a whole. One of my central sources is Thomas Douglas’ article “Enhancing Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth” (2014). In my analysis, the moral evaluation of self-enhancement problematizes notions of autonomy, authenticity, and the relationship of technology with the agent.
I conclude that even though the well-being thesis is relatively strong against the counterarguments based on effort, the autonomy and authenticity of the agent, hyperagency, and the role of deliberation in moral agency, its main liability appears to be its most fundamentally ethical premise that improving well-being would constitute a right-maker. This is a controversial claim; additionally, even when this premise is accepted, definitions of the concept of well-being can limit the scope of the well-being thesis.
Keywords: Bioethics, human enhancement, technology, transhumanism, well-being